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This paper presents an extension of "collective models" that rationalize household 
demands as efficient allocations, allowing for the joint allocation of public and private goods. 
Starting from the problem of efficiency, and adding a separability assumption between public 
goods and exclusive private goods, we obtain two results. Firstly, we find some new restrictions 
upon the derivatives of the demand functions. Secondly, we predict how the sharing of household 
expenditures between the man and the woman changes when the exclusive good's prices changes, 
and we measure the effect of the consumption of public goods on this change. 
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1. Introduction 
Although people within the household exchange material and immaterial goods, we can only 
observe the material aggregate consumption that results from this exchange process. The diffi-
culty, of course, is that aggregate household consumption equals individual consumption in only 
three cases: single-person households, public goods, and in the case of goods whose consumption 
is exclusive to a household member (exclusive goods). 
Traditional models of household demand based on a representative consumer are called 
unitary models. Because empirical properties derived from them (aggregation, homogeneity, 
symmetry and negative semi-definiteness of the Slutsky matrix) have received little empirical 
support, we may conclude that individual rationality presents serious difficulties when attempt-
ing to explain household behavior. 
Alternatively, household behavior can be modeled as a decision process in which several 
individuals are involved. These kinds of models, known as collective models, have two princi-
pal objectives. i) to derive empirical properties of household demand, and ii) to recover the 
intrahousehold allocations of goods and welfare. 
Within collective models, there is a strand of the literature that is based on the idea that "the 
household is modeled as a two-member collectivity taking Pareto-efficient decisions" (Chiappori, 
1988). According to the assumptions of the model, we distinguish between three groups of 
papers which, in chronological order, are: 
1) Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Homey (1981) model household decisions as 
the equilibrium from a Nash bargaining game where the threat point is a function of exogenous 
variables called extrahousehold environmental parameters (EEP). The Nash bargaining game 
results in efficient outcomes, so these models fit into Chiappori's efficiency idea. 
2) Chiappori (1988, 1992) provides the most general framework for the study of the in-
trahousehold allocation of private goods under the sole assumption of efficiency. Within this 
framework, there are two types of important results: those involving empirical properties of 
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labor supply functions for egoistic agents, and those referring to the recovery of the sharing rule 
between household members. 
3) The third group of models also starts from the efficiency premise but adds the assumption 
of the existence of, at least, a distribution factor that affects the reserve utility of both agents 
but does not affect either their preferences for goods or the budget constraint. A distribution 
factor is, therefore, an EEP in McElroy's terminology. This methodology is applied, for example, 
in Bourguignon et al. (1993, 1995), Browning and Chiappori (1994), Browning et al. (1994), 
and Chiappori et al. (1997). 
The aim of this paper is to derive empirical properties of the household demands, and 
to recover intrahousehold allocations in the presence of public goods. For this purpose, we 
extend Chiappori's (1988) parametric model allowing for the joint choice between public and 
private goods. The assumption of weak separability between private and public goods, implicit 
in Chiappori's model, does not lead to any new result. But under a different separability 
assumption between public goods and exclusive goods, we obtain the following results: 
1) Efficiency necessary conditions on household demands for private and public goods. We 
prove that the conditions obtained in Chiappori (1988) are a particular case of ours when the 
consumption of public goods is zero. 
2) We do not recover the intrahousehold allocation of private goods completely, but we do 
recover its variation with respect to prices. The corresponding results in Chiappori's model 
without public goods are nested into ours. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the notation and Chiappori's 
main results under weak separable preferences between private and public goods. In section 3 
we introduce a different separability assumption and derive our results. In section 4 we apply 
the above results for a particular specification of household demands. In section 5 we discuss the 
main restrictions and contributions of our model to the empirical study of consumer behavior. 
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2. The Initial Model: Notation and Chiappori's Results 
Assume that a household consists of two adults who decide on how to allocate the household 
endowment, X, among goods, which we classify into three groups. First, there are private goods 
like food, alcohol, tobacco, and goods linked to education or entertainment activities for which 
individual consumptions are unobservable. What we observe is the aggregate consumption of 
private goods Z = Zl + Z2, where Zi is the amount consumed by agent i for i = 1,2. Second, we 
observe individual expenditures for some adult exclusive goods, like women's or men's clothing 
expenditures. Leisure is a special case of an exclusive good included in Chiappori (1988) but 
which is excluded from our model. We denote by qi the exclusive good consumed by agent i. 
Finally, household public goods (Q) are goods that are characterized by non-rivalry and non-
exclusion, for which individual consumption coincides with the aggregate amount. Expenditures 
on housing and furniture and their maintenance are household public goods, which we call "clean 
house" following Pollak and Wachter (1975). 
Household preferences are characterized by a pair of utility functions, Ui (qi, Zi, Q) for i = 
1,2, which are assumed to be strictly monotonic, strongly quasi-concave, and twice continuously 
differentiable. 
To sum up, the household is an economy, ~, characterized by two consumption sets, {qi, Zi, Q} c 
JRt, two utility functions Ui : {qi, Zi, Q} ---7 JR, i = 1,2, and the income household endowment, 
X. 
2.1. Chiappori's (1988) Results: A Reinterpretation 
Chiappori's original model studies the following question: what conditions characterize the 
leisure (Li) and private goods (Z) demands if they arise from an efficient allocation? The 
demand functions with this property are called collectively rational for egoistic agents. 
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Definition 1. Let T be the time endowment for both agents. For any wages, WI, W2, and non-
labor income, y, the household demand for leisure er} (W1,W2,Y),I} (Wl,W2,Y)) is said to be 
collectively rational for egoistic agents (eREA) if there exist two demand functions Zl 
and Z2 from lRt to lR+, and two utility functions U1 (L1, Zl) and U2 (L2, Z2) such that the 
-1 -2 -1 -2 functions L , L , Z , Z solve the following problem: 
Max U1 (L1 Zl) + II.(W W y) U2 (L2 z2) 1 2 1 2 ' r 1, 2, , L ,L ,Z ,Z 
The first order conditions for this problem are: 
U;2 (L2, Z2) 
Zl +Z2 
W1 U;1 (L1,Zl), 
W2U;2 (L2,Z2), 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
One of the main reasons why adults decide to live together is to enjoy scale economies in 
the consumption of public goods. From this perspective, the above model can be reinterpreted 
as a model under the assumption of weakly separable preferences between private and exclusive 
goods, on the one hand, and public goods, on the other. If we let C be the price of a single 
public good and replace labor supply (T - Li) by _qi, wages Wi by prices Pi, and non-labor 
income y by private and exclusive goods expenditures x = X - CQ, then the problem becomes: 
(P2) 
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The first order conditions for this new problem are: 
V~l (ql, Zl) 
V;2 (q2, Z2) 
PIV;l (ql,Zl) , 
P2V;2 (q2, Z2) , 
(4) 
(5) 
ui (vi (ql, Zl) ,v~ (Q)) v~Q (Q) ui (vI (q2, Z2) ,v~ (Q)) v~Q (Q) 
ul(vi(ql,Zl),vHQ))viz dql,zl) + Uf(vr(q2,Z2),v~(Q))viz2(q2,Z2) =c, (6) 
Z2 + P2q2 = (X - CQ) - Plql - Zl. (7) 
This new problem can be interpreted as a two stage problem. At the first stage, the household 
allocates total expenditure between private, exclusive and public goods, and at the second 
stage, expenditures on private and exclusive goods are allocated among household members. 
Conditions (4), (5) and (7) are the same as conditions (1) to (3), respectively, in the problem 
(PI) without public goods. Therefore, Chiappori's results obtained from that problem apply to 
the study of the allocation of the private and exclusive goods expenditures in the second stage 
of problem (P2). 
Under our assumptions, the demand functions ql, q2 from lRt to lR+ are twice differentiable. 
We use the following notation from Chiappori (1988): 
Mk = ~W:, where !vI = ql, q2, zl, Z2, etc., and K = Pl,P2, X 
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B - qPl 
- 2' qx 
{3 = 1- D:. 
Chiappori (1988) arrives to the following result: 
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and 
Proposition 1. Let the demand functions ql and q2satisfy the two following regularity condi-
tions for each (Pl,P2, x) : 
(R1) 
(R2) 
For ql, q2 to be collectively rational for egoistic agents in the sense of Definition 1, the 
following conditions are necessary: 
(eREA a) 
(eREA b) 
If these conditions are satisfied, Zl and Z2 are unique up to an additive constant, and Zi depends 
only on qi (Pl,P2, x) and Pi (i = 1,2). 
The conditions (CREA a, b) are empirical properties on first and second demand derivatives. 
In view of Proposition 1, if these properties are not satisfied, then we know that household 
outcomes are not efficient. 
We are also interested in recovering the unobserved intrahousehold allocation of private 
goods. We have interpreted that the private goods expenditures in the second stage of problem 
(P2) are allocated between the two household members. Then, conditional on that allocation, 
each one solves his/her own utility maximization problem. From the Second Welfare Theo-
rem, we know that if (qh, q2* , Zh, Z2*) is an efficient allocation and x > 0 is the household 
expenditure on private and exclusive goods, there exists a price vector (Pi,P2) in IR~, such 
that (qh,q2*,Zh,Z2*;pi,P2) is the competitive equilibrium that solves the pair of individual 
problems: 
{ lf~f s.t. i = 1,2, 
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where </i* = pi qi* + Zi*. Based on this Theorem we define the existence of a sharing rule function. 
Definition 2. Let ql (Pl,P2,x)and Zl (Pl,P2,X) be two demand functions that solve the prob-
lem 
Then the function cP : lRt -t ]0, X[ is the sharing rule, where 
The conditions (CREA a, b) of Proposition 1 imply the existence of such a sharing rule. 
Proposition 2. (Chiappori, 1988 and 1992). Given two demand functions ql and q2 satisfying 
conditions (CREA a, b) of Proposition 1, a sharing rule is defined up to an additive constant; 
specifically, its partial derivatives are given by 
The derivative of the sharing rule with respect to x, a, is the share of marginal expenditure 
received by member 1. f3 = 1 - a, is the share of marginal expenditure received by member 
2. cPPi is the marginal change in expenditures when there is a change in the price Pi. We are 
interested in the sign of these derivatives for specific demand functions (see below the example 
in section 4). 
Because of the weak separability assumption, this model does not allow us to analyze the 
effect of public goods on the intrahousehold allocation of private goods. In the following section 
we introduce another separability assumption between public and exclusive goods in order to 
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obtain an expression for the relationship between the amount of public goods and the sharing 
rule which guides the allocation of the private good expenditures. 
3. The Extended Model: Public Good Effect 
In general, we expect that the price of a public good affects the demand for both private and 
exclusive goods. In this paper, however, we only allow for the public good effect on the private 
good demand but not on the exclusive good demand. For this purpose, we make the following 
separability assumption between household public goods and exclusive goods: 
Assumption S. The public good price does not enter the exclusive good demand and the 
exclusive good price does not enter the public good demand. Mathematically: 
q~ = 0, QPi = 0 i = 1,2. (8) 
The advantage of this assumption is that it is testable. For example, if we estimate three 
demand functions for women's clothing, men's clothing and the clean house, we can test if 
clothing prices affect the clean house demand, and if the clean house price affects clothing 
demands. Intuitively, the wage rate may very well affect the demand for public goods. This is 
why we exclude leisure from the list of exclusive goods in what follows. 
In this framework, we define a collectively rational behavior. 
Definition 3. Household demands for the exclusive goods (ql (Pl,P2,X) ,q2 (Pl,P2,X)) and 
for the public good Q (c, X) are said to be collectively rational (CR*) if there exist two 
demand functions Zl and Z2 from IRt to IR+, and two utility functions U1 (Ll, zl, Q) and 
U2 (L2, Z2, Q) such that, for all (PI, P2, c, X) in IRt and f.L E IR+, the functions ql, q2, ZI ,Z2, Q, 
solve the problem 
(P3) 
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The first order conditions are: 
(8) 
(9) 
U~ (ql, Zl , Q) U~ (q2, Z2, Q) 
U} (ql,Zl,Q) + U'l (q2,Z2,Q) = C, (10) 
(11) 
In what follows, we keep Chiappori's notation (A, B, a, (3), but introduce new notations to 
include the public good demand: 
Mk=~'t, lvI=ql, q2, Q, Zl, Z2,etc. and K=Pl,P2,C,X. 
a = { 0[1 - !~: =~:; r 1 
otherwise, 
F{ AB(6x-~) . Apl-BAx-(Bp2-ABx) If APl - BAx =1= BP2 - ABx o otherwise, 
(3 = 1- a. 
When a term is multiplied by b, we denote it with '; for example, a' = ab, a~ = (ab)x = 
axb +bxa. 
10 
The following result is based on conditions (8), (9) and (11). 
Proposition 3. Let the demand functions ql, q2 and Q satisfy the two following regularity 
conditions. For each (Pl,P2,C,X) in Rt, 
(R*l) 
(R*2) 
For ql, q2, Q to be collectively rational in the sense of Definition 3, the following conditions 
are necessary: 
(a' + 'Y) Ax + A (a~ + 'Yx) = ~ (a~ + 'Ye) + (a~ + 'YP2 ) , (CR* a) 
( CR* b) 
If these conditions are satisfied, then we can recover the functions ZJi and Z~i' and Zi only 
depends on qi (Pl,P2,X), Q (c,X) and Pi (i = 1,2). 
See the proof in Appendix 1. 
Corollary 1. The conditions (CREA a) and (CREA b) from the model without public goods 
are nested in conditions (CR* a) and (CR* b) for the case Q = o. 
Proof. If Q = 0, then 8 = (Dj}) = Qct~Qx = 1. This implies that 'Y = 0, ex' = a8 = a, /3' = 
/38 = /3, and ae = O. Therefore, replacing these in the expression (CR* a): 
{ ( a' + 'Y) Ax + A ( a~ + 'Y x) - ~ ( a~ + 'Ye) - (a~2 + 'Y P2) = 0 } , becomes expression (CREA 
a): {aAx + Aax - ap2 = O} . Analogously, expression (CR * b) becomes (CREA b) when Q = 
O .• 
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The conditions (CR* a) and (CR* b) are empirical properties of the demand functions 
formulated in terms of their first and second derivatives with respect to prices and household 
expenditures. Thus, for a particular system of demand functions, these conditions will appear 
as parameter restrictions. 
We are interested in the effect of public goods on the sharing rule which gives us the individual 
expenditure on private goods. 
Definition 4. Let qi(Pl,P2,X), Zi(Pl,P2,C,X) and Q(c,X), for i - 1,2, be the demand 
functions that solve the problem 
Then the function <P : lRt -t ]0, X[ is the sharing rule for private goods, where 
As before, the efficiency conditions of Proposition 3 are sufficient for the existence of the 
sharing rule for private goods. 
Proposition 4. Given the demand functions ql, q2 and Q, satisfying conditions (CR* a) and 
(CR* b) of Proposition 3, the derivatives of the sharing rule for private goods with respect to 
prices are given by 
<PPl = B (-{38 + ,) = <PPl8 + B" 
<PP2 A (a8 + ,) = <PP28 + A" 
where <P is the sharing rule in the model without public goods. 
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The proof is in Appendix 2. 
Corollary 2. In the case of zero consumption of public goods, the derivatives of the sharing 
rule with respect to prices in the model without public goods, <PPi' coincides with the derivatives 
of the sharing rule for private goods in the model with public goods, <J?Pi' 
Proof. If Q = 0, 8 = 1 and 'Y = 0, then 
<J?Pl = <PP1 8 + B, = <PP1' 
<J?P2 <PP2 8 + A, = <PP2' 
• 
Remark 1. We observe two components in the derivatives of the sharing rule with respect to 
prices. If public goods are normal goods, then the first component, <PPi8, is smaller in absolute 
value than <PPi because 8 E [0,1]. 
We have 8 = Qct~Qx. In the optimal allocation, the numerator is the Slutsky equation, i.e., 
the substitution effect calculated from the Hicksian demand for public good. The denominator 
is the total effect calculated from the Marshallian demand. If public goods are normal goods, 
then the substitution effect has an absolute value smaller than the total effect, and we therefore 
4. An Illustrative Example 
We take the functional form of Chiappori's example (1988 and 1992) for exclusive goods demand, 
we add a public good demand, and we assume that such demands satisfy assumption (5) : 
ql (X,Pl,P2) 
q2 (X,Pl,P2) 
al + blX + CIX log X + diPl + drp2, 
a2 + b2X + C2X log X + d~Pl + d~P2' 
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(4.1) 
(4.2) 
Q(X,C) (4.3) 
We calculate the terms used in Proposition 3: 
Qx = b3 + C3 + c3 log X , Qxx = C3/X , 
IPi = 0, 
~ = QxQx + QQxx ~ Q 
Vx Qc Qc' Vc = X· 
4.1. The Initial Model without Public Goods 
In this example, the regularity conditions (R1) qiq; i= 0 and (R2) (ABx - B[J2 i= BAx - Bp2 ) 
are satisfied for all x when Cl b2 i= c2b1 . 
The demand functions are linear in prices, so that CY[J2 = {3Pl = O. The necessary conditions 
imposed by colllective rationality for egoistic agents are: 
(CRAE a) 
(CRAE b) 
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Since axA + aAx = a~ aA = a~ (C2bl ~clb2 q; ~) = 0, these conditions are always satisfied for 
all values of the parameters ai, bi , Ci, dL d{, i,j = 1,2. Consequently, we cannot test efficiency for 
this functional form. We can, however, recover the derivatives of the sharing rule: 
where H = C2bI - CIb2. 
We want to know the sign of these derivatives in order to predict whether a change in private 
and exclusive goods expenditures, x, or a change in exclusive goods prices, will produce either an 
increase or a decrease in individual expenditures. If we assume that all goods are normal, then 
q~ > 0, Qx > 0 for all X, (bi > 0 and Ci > 0) and q~i < 0, Qc < 0 (d~ < 0,d3 < 0). The cross-price 
effect, q~j' is negative if the good qi is a gross complement of good qj (d{ < 0) and it is positive 
if qi is a gross substitute for qj (d! > 0) . The denominator, H, can be positive or negative.If 
H > 0 then, sign (<i>Pl) = sign (dD. Thus, if PI increases and q2 is a gross substitute for qI, 
we then predict an increase in the share of expenditure received by member 1. In Chiappori's 
example, ql and q2 are leisure demands, PI and P2 are the wages, and the sharing rule is defined 
for non-labor income. In this case, we observe an increase in the man's wage and leisure is a 
normal good, and the man's labor supply will therefore increase. If the woman's leisure is a 
gross substitute (gross complement) of the man's leisure, <i>Pl > 0 (<i>Pl < 0), then we predict an 
increase (decrease) of the man's share of non-labor income. 
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4.2. The Extended Model with Public Goods 
The regularity conditions (R*l) and (R*2) are satisfied if d3 =J. 0 and c1b2 =J. c2bl. Since, for this 
example, a~ = 'YP2 = (3Pl = 'YP1 = 0, the conditions (CR*a) and (CR*b) of Proposition 3 are: 
(CR* a) 
((31 - 'Y) Bx + B ((3~ - 'Y x) = ~ ((3~ - 'Ye) . (CR* b) 
By replacing the equality terms in (CR*a) and simplifying, we have: 
So, the expression (CR*a) that results equating the right hand sides of (4.4) and (4.5) is: 
aQQxx + q;x = 0 
Q 'Y 2 . c qx (4.6) 
And on replacing (4.6) from the demand functions, we obtain: 
(4.7) 
Since condition (4.7) is always satisfied by these demand functions, we can not test efficiency in 
this example. 
We calculate the derivatives of the sharing rule for private goods and obtain: 
(4.8) 
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(4.9) 
Since I <PPi 81 ::; I<PPi I (see Remark 1), the first effect of public good consumption is the reduction 
of the amount of the sharing rule change with respect to price variation. The second component 
is (- ~~~ Qqi) , whose sign depends on those of H and d~ . If H > 0, sign ( - ~~~ Qqi) = 
sign (dD. 
When we consider the two components, we conclude that, if H > 0, sign (<PP1) = sign (d~) 
and the effect in the sharing rule produced by a change in PI has the same sign as in the model 
without public goods: the sign is positive if q2 is a gross substitute of ql and it is negative if q2 
is a gross complement of ql. 
Summing up, the sign of a sharing rule change caused by a price variation does not depend 
on public goods consumption, but the presence of the public good does, in fact, modify the 
amount of this sharing rule change. 
5. Conclusions 
The main restriction of the model is our separability assumption which does not allow any effect 
of the exclusive good's prices on the demand for the public good. Since the public good demand 
depends on wages, our model cannot be used for the study of the empirical properties of labor 
supply, considered as an exclusive good. In contrast to the weak separability, however, our 
separability assumption allows the prices of public goods to enter the private good demand. 
Hence, our collective model allows the study of the effect of public goods on the allocation of 
private expenditures. 
With regard to the contributions of this paper, we have derived new testable restrictions 
on observable behavior (the demand for public and exclusive goods). These restrictions are 
necesary conditions for Pareto efficiency. We show that the parametric restrictions derived by 
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Chiappori (1988) for the case without public goods are nested in our conditions for the case 
with public goods. On the other hand, the collective setting developed here allows us to learn 
about the allocation of household expenditures in private goods between the two agents: the 
man and the woman. In particular, we can predict how the sharing of household expenditures 
between the man an the woman changes when the exclusive goods' prices change. This change 
depends on the amount of the public good. In the context of our model, we can then study the 
effect of any tax policy that changes the exclusive goods' prices on the distribution of household 
expenditures in private goods between the husband and the wife, and we can measure how the 
extent of this effect depends on the amount of public goods that exists in the home. 
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6. Appendix 1 
Let us consider Chiappori's Lemma, generalized for m + 1 functions. 
Lemma 1. Let p, Xl, X 2, .'" xm be any m+ 1 Coo functions from some open, non-empty subset 
B ofll~n to JR, with n 2: m and such that gradXI, gradX2, .. , gradxm are noncolinear. For a 
function e from ]Rm to]R, such that 
for all (Xl, '" xn) E B, 
p(XI' .. , xn) e [Xl (Xl, .. , xn), X2(XI' .. , xn), '" Xm(XI' '" Xn)] 
to exist in a neighborhood of any point of B, it is necessary and sufficient that the vectors 
gradp, gradXI, gradX2, "., gradxm are always colinear. 
Applying the above lemma to the first order conditions of the efficiency problem, we obtain 
the conditions for collective rationality and the expressions for the derivatives of the sharing 
rule. The first order conditions for the efficiency problem are: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
U;l (ql,ZI,Q) =PIU;l (ql,Zl,Q), 
U;2 (q2, Z2, Q) = P2 U;2 (q2, Z2, Q) , 
UQ(ql,Zl,Q) u2 (q2,Z2,Q) _ 
Ul(ql,Zi,Q) + Ul(q2,Z2,Q) - C, 
Plql + P2q2 + Zl + Z2 + CQ = X. 
Consider any three functions ql, q2, Q. For these functions to be C R* demand functions, it 
is necessary that there exist two functions Zl and Z2 such that the first order conditions are 
satisfied. 
Let (PI, P2, C, X) be a point in ]R4 such that ql, q2 and Q are not corner solutions and such 
that q~ =1= 0, q; =1= 0 and Qc =1= O. Relation (1) can be written (and symmetrically relation (2)): 
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Therefore, gradZi , grad qi, gradQ, grad PI, are colinear. The lemma applies directly here, 
with n = 4 and X I (.) = qI(PI,P2,C,X), X 2(.) = Q(PI,P2,C,X), X3(.) = PI, p(.) = 
zI (PI,P2,C,X), since qi; =/- 0, q; =/- 0 and Qc =/- o. Thus, locally, Zi = () (qi,Q,pi) for i = 1,2. 
The application of the lemma requires that rank [grad ql, gradQ, grad PI] = 3. The 
separability assumption implies: q~ = 0, QPi = 0, for i = 1,2, so that the above matrix expression 
gives: 
I 0 1 qPl I 0 1 I 0 1 I 0 1 
I 0 0 
qPl qPl qPl 
rank qP2 =3,~ I 0 0 =/-0, or I 0 0 1= O,or 0 Qc 0 
0 Qc 0 qP2 qP2 q~ Qx 0 0 Qc 0 q~ Qx 0 
q; Qx 0 
Therefore, if we assume 
q~ 1= 0, q; =/- 0, Qc =/- 0, (R1) 
the above rank condition holds. We call these conditions regularity conditions because these are 
fulfilled in most cases. 
From the budget constraint (4), one obtains that 
Define <p(qI,Q,pI) = _ZI(ql,Q,pI) - pIqI. Note that <p(qI,Q,p1) = -<1?(PI,P2,C,X). Our 
objetive is to find the derivatives of the sharing rule for private goods (<1», so we will develop 
the gradient expression for <po 
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1= O. 
Since the left hand side of (A2) only depends on Z2, q2 and P2, the right hand side, (X -CQ)+ 
<p( qI, Q, pI), depends on these same variables, and its gradient is coli near with the gradients of 
q2, Q and P2. Applying the lemma to this expression, one gets: 
! grad(X-CQ)+<p(ql,Q,pl) gradq2 gradQ gradP2!=O.NotethatgradP2= 
The above determinant is equal to: 
2 
Let B = ~, and D = !kQc , then, from this determinant we obtain: qx x 
Dividing by D, we eliminate the term BQx(<pQ - C) and get: 
and calling (j = (D"bQ ) , the above expression gives: 
23 
o 
1 
o 
o 
(A3) 
Since the term <Pql is not observable, we continue developing the above expression. The right 
hand side B8-<pql (q~l - Bq~) in (A3) depends only on ql, Q and PI, that enter <po Again, we can 
apply the lemma because of colinearity among gradients of this expression and of ql, Q and PI. 
Taking into account that the separability assumption makes 8pi = 0, Bc = 0 and q~ic = q~c = 0, 
the determinant for the gradients is equal to: 
BP2 8 - <Pqqq~2(q~1 - Bq~) - <Piq~lP2 - Bp2q~ - Bq~2X) q~2 0 
B8c - <PqQQC(q~l - Bq;J 0 Qc = 0 
8Bx + B8x - ('Pqqq~ + 'PqQQX)(q~l - Bq~) - 'Pq(q~l X - Bxq~ - Bq~x) q~ Qx 
1 
If A = ~, then the above determinant gives: 
q" 
o = AD (OBx + B8x - ('Pqqq; + 'PqQQX)(q~l - Bq;) - 'Pq(q~lx - Bxq~ - Bq~x)) -
-A (B8c - 'PqQQC(q~l - Bq;)) - D (Bp2 8 - 'Pqqq~(q~l - Bq;) - 'Pq(q~lP2 - BP2 q! - Bq~2X)) 
Dividing by D, and since Aq;: = q~2' the terms multiplying 'Pqq are eliminated. Since % = Qx, 
the term in 'PqQ is also eliminated. Consider also that q~2x - Aq;x = Axq; and q~lP2 - Aq~lx = 
Apl q;. Carrying together in the left side the terms mUltiplied by 'Pq1 gives: 
We denote B' = Bo, and the above expression gives: 
(A4) 
In (A4) the only unobservable term is 'Pql, so we can obtain 'Pq1 in terms of the demand para-
meters of public and exclusive goods. And replacing this expression in (A3), we also obtain an 
observable expression for 'PPl. In order to calculate 'Pql, we assume that the following regularity 
24 
condition is satisfied: 
(R2) 
We can calculate 'Pq1 from (A4) and get: 
(1) 
where 
Replacing 'Pq1 in (A3), the expression for 'PPl is: 
I I qPl (1) 'PPl = B + (et + 'Y ) qi - B . (2) 
Summing up, we have obtained expressions (1) and (2) for 'Pq1 and 'PP1' We can obtain the em-
pirical restrictions implied by collective rationality (CR*1) and (CR*2) from these expressions. 
Firstly, since 'Pq1 depends on qI, Q and PI, again from the lemma: 
I q~ x 1 I (et + 'Y) (q!)2 - qi (etP2 + 'YP2 ) A 0 
-q~(etc+'Yc) 0 D =0, 
I ql 1 I (et + 'Y) (q!)2 - qi (etx + 'Y x) 1 1 
and this determinant gives: 
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Since qpq1~:z: _ A~ = Ax, we obtain the first empirical restriction: 
:z: q:z: 
(CR* 1) 
Secondly, for 'Pq1 and 'PP1 to be compatible and for the integrability of 'P, it is necessary that 
'Pq1p1 = 'PP1 q1 0 To compute this, consider 
'P (ql (PI,P2,X) , Q (C, X) ,PI) => 
o 0 OPI 0 OP2 0 oC 0 oX 
~I~=~~~I+~~~I+OC~~I+~~~I 
o 0 OPI 0 OP2 0 oC 0 oX 
OPI 'Pq1 = OPI 'Pq1 OPI + OP2 'Pq1 OPI + oC'Pq1 OPI + oX'Pq1 OPI 
To calculate these derivatives we need the following Jacobian matrix g~1,]J2,gx;.) 0 If we define 
1 ,]J2 , ,q 
the mapping IT: (PI,P2,C,X) ---+ (PI,P2,Q,ql), the Jacobian matrix of IT is: 
J(IT) = 0 (PI,P2, Q, ql) 
O(PI,P2,C,X) 
And the J acobian matrix of IT-I is: 
o o 
(J(IT))-I = 
1 
o 1 0 
1 By the Theorem of the Inverse Function 
1 
0 
0 
1 QP1 
0 
1 
0 
1 QP2 
o 
o 
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0 0 
0 0 
IJ(IT) I = q;Qc o 
Qc Qx 
0 qi 
Then, the expression for second derivatives of <p are: 
Equating the two above expressions we obtain: 
and since a' = ao, and (3' = (1 - a) 0 = (30 =} (3~ = o(3x + (3ox, (3~ = (3oc, (3~1 = o(3Pl' we 
express the above equality as the second empirical restriction: 
(CR* 2) 
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7. Appendix 2 
Once the compatibility condition 'Pq1p1 = 'PPl ql is fulfilled, we can integrate and obtain 'P, and 
since we have defined <I> as the sharing rule, then 
In Appendix 1 we obtained the following expressions: 
Thus, the relationship between <I> and 'P gives us the derivatives of the sharing rule with respect 
to prices: 
But we can not recover <I>c and <I>x 
since we do not know 'PQ. 
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